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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
C. ED LEWIS COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

vs.
MIKE S. DRAGOS,

8072

.

Defendant and Respondent.

I

BRIEF OF APPELLANT.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
All citations referred to herein·refer to the transcript
records, the numbering of which appears in red.
This lawsuit is brought for damages against the defendant and respondent, Mike Dragos, for the loss of plain-
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tiff's brokerage fee for the sale of that certain real property described in the listing contract (Exhibit P-1), wherein one Ted Russell and his wife, Manilla Russell, listed for
sale with the plaintiff and appellant, for the sale price of
$66,000.00. During the term Qf the listing, the plaintiff
and appellant obtained a purchaser therefor, one Ralph
Brimhall, who agreed to pay $55,000.00 therefor and who
paid $1,000.00 as earnest money to the said plaintiff and
- appellant, and the said Russells agreed to accept said sum
of $55,000.00. ~The, said Ralph Brimhall was and is, at all
times, able, ready, and willing to pay to the said Ted Russell
and his wife the sum of $55,000.00 (R. p. 15, L. 25; R. p.
31, L. 23-27; R. p. 65, L. 16-20). After paying the $1,000.00
down to the plaintiff, the said Ralph Brimhall went to the
said real property to look it over and while there, on the
4th day of September, 1952, saw the defendant, Mike S.
Dragos, and had a conversation with him. During said
conversation the defendant and respondent pointed out to
the said Brimhall the line which he claimed as his boundary
line, which line ran approximately sixteen inches under the
cabins owned by the said Ted Russell and his wife (R. p.
67; R. p. 68, L. 1-8), and informed the said purchaser,
Ralph Brimhall, that he would require $3,000.00 for his
property which extended under said cabins (R. p. 68).
The saiQ Ralph Brimhall, on learning of the claim of the
defendant and respondent, Mike Dragos, informed the
-plaintiff .and, appellant that he did not desire to purchase
trouble and therefore informed the plaintiff and appellant
that the deal was off.
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On the 19th day of November, 1951, the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in the case of Dragos et ux
v. Russell et ux, Civil No. 7568, and therein reversed the
decision of the lower court, Judge Baker, in the Third
Judicial District Court, and remanded the case for the
following purposes :
"However, it cannot be ascertained with certainty, just how much or what portion of the defendants' sewer line is on the defendant's property.
The case should be reversed and remanded. Additional evidence should be taken to determine what
description is necessary to fix the boundary between the lots of the parties so that the new line
correctly coincides with the fence line which is
conclusively shown to be north of the cabins. (Italics ours.)
Judge Baker took additional evidence as to where the
boundary line was to be, disregarding the Supreme Court's
decision that the boundary line was the old fence line and
that appeal was taken to the Supreme Court on the 20th
day of August, 1952, as Civil No. 7895.
Plaintiff filed its complaint (R. p. 1) ; defendant filed
his answer (R. p. 2) ; defendant filed his motion to dismiss
(R. p. 4), which the court denied. The issues were joined.
The trial was had during the week of May 6, 1953.
The action was tried before the Honorable A. H. Ellett
and judgment of no cause of action was entered against the
plaintiff on the 18th day of May, 1953. The plaintiff, on
the 21st day of May, 1953, filed its objections to the proposed findings and filed its own proposed findings of fact
(R. p. 122). The court rejected the plaintiff's proposed
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findings and entered its findings of fact and conclusions
of law (R. p. 118).
The appellant has appealed. from the judgment of the
court of no cause of action, and the whole thereof.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE
COURT'S FINDING NO. 3 AND THE EVIDENCE IS CONTRARY TO SAID FINDING.

POINT II.
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING NO.4 IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISIONS AFTER THAT ENTERED BY THIS, THE SUPREME COURT, IN
THE CASE DRAGOS ET UX V. RUSSELL ET
UX,. NO. 7568 (R. 43, 44, and 47).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE
COURT'S FINDING NO. 3 AND THE EVIDENCE IS CONTRARY TO SAID FINDING.
There is no substantial evidence in the record to support the court's finding that the defendant, Mike Dragos,
never made any misrepresentations of fact as to where
the boundary line existed between the property of Ted
Russell and himself. It is the contention of the appellant
that he did make misrepresentations to the said Ralph
Brimhall as t~ where the line was. Said Ralph Brimhall
went to see the property of the said Ted Russell on or
about the 4th day of September, 1952 (R. p. 66, L. 28)
and there had a conversation with the defendant Dragos.
During the conversation Dragos pointed to a concrete brick
lying on the ground and pointed out to the said Ralph
Brimhall that his line ran due east and west from where
that brick was lying (R. p. 67, L. 16) and that the said
line as pointed out by Dragos ran sixteen inches under the
cabins owned by the said Russell (R. p. 68) and claimed
that he, Dragos, was the owner of the property north of
said line to the extent of sixteen inches and that_he wanted
from $3,000.00 to $5,000.00 for that if Mr. Brimhall bought
the property (R. p. 68).
The said Brimhall was able, ready, and willing to buy
the said property from the said Russell through the plaintiff and had agreed to pay the sum of $55,000.00 therefor,·
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which the said Ted Russell had agreed to receive (R. p.
15, L. 25; R. p. 31, L. 23-27; R. p. 65, L. 16-20). Brimhall
wanted to buy this property upon which the cabins stood,
but stated in the record that when he discovered that the
defendant Dragos claimed to own sixteen inches under the
cabins, that he didn't want to buy trouble (R. p. 68, L. 8).
There is no substantial evidence in the entire record
of the defendant Dragos or any of his witnesses, refuting
or disputing the testimony of Ralph Brimhall, sufficient
to support the court's finding. Neither did he attack the
testimony of Ralph Brimhall in the record. It is true that
Dragos, on the stand, said he had never seen Brimhall, but
such statement was not credible, and the court said he did
not believe Dragos.
In a law case tried to a court without a jury, it is the
duty of the appellate court to determine whether or not
there is substantial evidence to support the court's finding.
The case of Cobb v. Hartenstein, 47 Utah 174, in regard to the right of the Supreme Court to determine
whether or not evidence is substantial and sufficient· to
sustain a finding, the court said:
"But, as we have already pointed out, where a
defense or a complete right of action depends upon
diverse elements, it is the duty of every reviewing
court, when proper assignments are made and insisted upon, to scrutinize the evidence, and from
it determine whether there is some substan_tial evidence in support of every essential element. In
doing that the court is neither weighing the evi·
dence nor passing upon the credibility of the witnesses, but is merely discharging the duty imposed
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upon it by law. Of course, the easy thing to do
would be to follow the findings of the trial court or
jury, whatever they may be. If we merely consulted
our own inclinations, and if we recognized no higher
duty than to follow the course of least resistance,
we should in every case abide by the findings of
the lower courts or juries. Whenever, in our j udgment, there is some substantial evidence, either
direct or inferential, in support of every element
which is necessary to sustain the judgment, and
there are no errors of law, we unhesitatingly affirm
the judgment. We, however, should as unhesitatingly refuse to affirm where, in our judgment, there
is no substantial evidence in support of one or more
essential elements constituting the cause of action.
While upon questions of fact we may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury or trial
court, yet upon the question of whether there is
any substantial evidence in support of a particular
fact or element we may not permit the trial court
or jury to substitute their judgment for ours. In
arriving at a conclusion in that regard we must, as
a matter of course, abide by our own judgment and
understanding.''
See also the case of Baker
79 P. 2d 77.

v.

Wycoff, 95 Utah 199,

In Volume 40, page 500, of Words and Phrases, it is
stated:
"Test of 'substantial evidence' as respects right
of defendant to reversal on ground that verdict is
not supported by evidence is whether jury reasonably could find issue thereon. 'Substantial evidence'
is more than evidence which, if true, would have
probative force on issues, and must amount to more
than scintilla and constitute evidence on which jury
could without acting unreasonably decide in favor
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of plaintiff or party producing it; evidence favoring
facts which is such that reasonable men may fairly
differ as to whether it establishes them. State v.
Gregory, 96 S. W. 2d 47, 51, 52, 339 Mo. 133."
And further:
"'Substantial evidence' sufficient to meet 'presumption' or prima facie case implies that it must
be credible. Hildebrand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.,
17 P. 2d 651, 654, 45 Wyo. 175."
Then the question arises whether or not Mike Dragos
introduced any "substantial evidence" sufficient for the
court to base its findings that he had not made any misrepresentations to Brimhall, which caused the said Brimhall
to refuse to purchase the said land of Ted Russell. By the
test aforesaid, the Hildebrand case, supra, held that the evidence must be credible.. At the close of the defendant's case
the. court stated that he did not believe the defendant Dragos
or his wife, but that it was unnecessary to believe them, as
Dragos was entitled to rely on the subsequent decision of
Judge Baker. However, at most,' Dragos' testimony that he
had never seen Ralph Brimhall, a mere denial, is self-serving, whereas the testimony of Ralph Brimhall was that of a
disinterested witness and the whole record of the testimony
of Dragos, on direct and cross-examination, indicates that
the testimony of the defendant Dragos was incredible. Too,
the plaintiff's witness Robertson, who went to the property
on or about the 20th day of October, 1952, stated thatDragos
declared that Russell's cabins were on his (Dragos) property (R. p. 53, L. 14-30; R. p. 54, L. 1-13). The plaintiff,
as well as Russell, both testified that defendant Dragos
claimed the property under the buildings of the said Rus-
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sell. The trial court could not and did not give credence
to the testimony of the defendant Dragos wherein he stated
he had never seen the witness Ralph Brimhall.
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The case of Dragos et ux v. Russell et ux, Supreme
Court No. 7568, decided unequivocally where the boundary
line was between the said properties and that the said line
was north of the cabins owned by the said Ted Russell
and his wife and that, therefore, when the defendant Dragos
made the statement to said Brimhall that the line ran some
sixteen inches under the said cabins, it was false and untrue.
and made with the intention to obstruct the sale of said
property to the said Brimhall by the said Ted Russell
through the plaintiff. The said opinion of this court in
said action was prior to time to said misrepresentation.
This point will be more fully discussed under Point No. II.
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING NO. 4 IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
No.4 of the court's findings is contrary to law because
the court therein determined that the boundary line between the defendant Dragos and the said Ted Russell had
never been established. On the 19th day of November, 1951,
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the case
of Dragos et ux v. Russell et ux, Civil No. 7568, and therein
reversed the decision of the lower court, Judge Baker, in
the Third Judicial District Court, and remanded the ·case
for the following purposes:
"However, it cannot be ascertained with certainty, just how much or what portion of the defend-
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ants' sewer line is on the defendants' property. The
case should be reversed and remanded. Additional
evidence should be taken to determine what descrip .
tion is necessary to fix the boundary between the
lots of the parties so that the new line correctly
coincides with the fence line which is conclusively
shf!wn to be north of the cabins" (Italics ours).
Judge Baker took additional evidence as to where the
boundary line was to be, disregarding the Supreme Court's
decision that the boundary line was the old fence line and
that appeal was taken to the Supreme Court on the 20th
day of August, 1952, as Civil No. 7895.
Plaintiff contends that the boundary line had been
I
established and Dragos was bound thereby and that the
court had notice that it had been so established by Exhibit
P -3, a part of the record, which had been accepted in evidence. The court misconstrued the Supreme Court decision,
as is indicated by the court's statement. Judge Ellett stated
that the defendant Dragos had the right to fuss over where
that boundary was because the Supreme Court said "it is
where the old fence line was" and they said "we can't tell
where the old fence was." Plaintiff and appellant submits
that this is not in accord with the Supreme Court's decision
in case No. 7568. This court had determined that the boundary line was the old fence line ; that a tree was growing on
the old fence line, which line was north of the cabins.
The trial court further stated in the record that the sub·
sequent decision of Judge Baker, which was then appealed
from to the Supreme Court as Civil No. 7895, permited the
defendant Dragos to rely upon that decision and justify
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him in his opinion that the boundary· line ·had not been determined. Plaintiff and appellant submits that Judge Baker
as bound by the original decision of this court in Case No.
7568, and could not re-try the matter of the boundary line.
He was limited only to the purpose of the remand, to ..wit: to
take additional evidence to determine what description was
necessary to fix the boundary between the lots of the parties, so that the new line (to-wit, the old fence line) "correctly coincides with the fence line which is conclusively
shown to be north of the cabins" and to determine what
portion of the Russell sewer line was on the Dragos property, if any.
In support of Judge Baker's order now before the
Supreme Court, as Civil No. 7895, Judge Baker's Finding
No. 3 is as follows:
"That on or about the month of August, 1943,
the defendants began the construction of a motel
and began to erect on the northerly part of their
lot a number of cabins, said cabins being built of
cinder blocks, wood, and cement, and on the north
side of said cabins, defendants have installed a
sewer pipe line; that said construction of said building was close to the boundary line of plaintiffs' and
defendants' lots and that a portion of said cabins
and sewer line projected ..over and onto the plaintiffs' lot, beginning from one inch to approximately
three feet in an easterly and westerly direction on
the southern portion of the above described premises
belonging to the plaintiffs, and defendants completed said construction and cabins on or about
August, 1948."
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The order based upon said finding determined the
boundary line as being:
"Beginning at a point North 0°01'30" East
65~06 feet and South 89° 55' West 33 feet from the
Southwest corner of Lot 15, Block 33, Ten Acre
Plat 'A', Big Field Survey, and running South 89°
55' West 165 feet; thence North 89°36'52" West
330.002 feet."
The original description in t~e Dragos deed, according
to plaintiff Dragos' complaint, was :
"Beginning at a point 65.06 feet North of the
Southwest corner of Lot 15, Block 33, Ten Acre
Plat 'A', Big Field Survey, and running thence
North 66 feet; thence West 495 feet ; thence South
66 feet; thence East 495 feet to beginning."
The final order of Judge ·Baker in said action definitely
places the boundary line under the. cabins of the defendants
Russell and his wife, and the same is contrary to the remand and mandate of the Supreme Court.
If Judge Baker considered the said decision of this
court to be ambiguous and he could not understand what
the court required, he could not discard the said decision
of the Supreme Court and take other evidence upon the
matters already determined by the Supreme Court, but it
was his duty to make application to the Supreme Court for
further explanation. (See Appeal and Error, 5 C. J. S.
1494, Note 13, and the cases cited thereunder.)
In In re Crawford's Estate, 169 A. 438, 331 Pa. 127,
the court said :
I

"When an order of the supreme court is misunderstood or is not sufficiently clear, the proper
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practice is to petition the supreme court to clarify
the order."
Appellant insists that Judge Baker, the trial court,
could not re-hear or reconsider the matters decided by the
appellate court and it was the duty of the lower court to
follow the decision of the supreme court.
"The lower court cannot rehear or decide matters decided by the appellate court.'' Louisville Fire
Brick Works v. Tackett, 288 S. W. 665.
Appellant insists that the "law of the case" applies as it
is set out in Appeal and Error, 5 C. J. S. p. 1501, Sec. 1964,
where the doctrine is digested as follows:
"The lower court cannot rehear or reconsider
the matters decided by the appellate court, and it is
the duty of the lower court to follow the decision of
the appellate court, its action being deemed erroneous when at variance with the decision."
Cases to support the above are cited in Notes 68, 69
and 70.,
This court, in the case of Helper State Bank v. Crus,
81 P. 2d 359, syllabus 1, said :
"It is a well-established rule in this jurisdiction,
as well as in a majority of other jurisdictions, that
where the questions of law and fact are the same
the decision of the first appeal, whether right or
wrong, becomes the law of the case on second appeal and is binding as well on the parties to the
action, the trial court, and the appellate court."
And cites many cases therein.
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It is further stated in 5 C. J. S. pp. 1501-1502, Sec.

1964:
"The rule is that matters once determined by
the appellate court cannot, after remand,. be again
raised and relitigated in the lower court."
The cases cited in support of that are shown in Note
72. This is exactly what Judge Baker endeavored to do in
his second case, to-wit, re-determine the boundary line,
which is appealed to this court as Case No. 7895.
Appellant maintains that if Judge Baker in such subsequent case could not reconsider the question of the boundary line as previously determined by this court, then the
defendant Dragos could not rely upon Judge Baker's decision, nor have reasonable grounds to make a statement to
Ralph Brimhall that he owned the ground under the cabins
owned by the said Ted Russell and his wife, and having
made said statement, it was false as of the date that it
was made and, being false, and the said Ralph Brimhall
having refused to purchase the said property from said Ted
Russell, the plaintiff and appellant should therefore be entitled to recover its commission. Furthermore, the statement made by the trial court in this case that the said
Dragos had a right to fuss over the boundary line was not
according to law (R. p. 78, L. 20).

POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
QUESTIONS REGARDIN,G THE TRIAL
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COURT'S DECISIONS AFTER THAT ENTERED BY THIS, THE SUPREME COURT, IN
THE CASE DRAGOS ET UX V. RUSSELL ET
UX, NO. 7568 (R. 43, 44, and 47).
The court erred in overruling plaintiff's objection to
questions asked Mr. Russell on cross-examination (R. p.
43, L. 18) :

So last year we had two or three hearings
in this court again?
"Q.

"A.

In regards to what?

In regards to the fence line, where the
location of the fence line was to be?
"Q.

"A. y es.
All right, and various orders were made
about the fence line and the sewer line. Isn't that
right?"
"Q.

Plaintiff objected to those questions on the. grounds
that the court had received in evidence plaintiff's Exhibit
3 and therefore the foregoing questions were not the best
evidence, as Exhibit No. 3 was the best evidence. The objection was by the court overruled (R. p. 43, L. 30).
Adopting the argument in Point No. II, appellant maintains that all subsequent decisions by Judge Baker and herein referred to by counsel for the defendant had no effect
whatsoever in law and therefore it was objectionable for
the court to permit questions to be asked about such subsequent decisions.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion we submit that there is no substantial
evidence to support the verdict and that said verdict is
contrary to law and that the same should be reversed and
remanded.
Respectfully submitted,
PERRIS S. JENSEN,
GLEN Y. RICHARDS,
A tto14neys for Appellant.

JENSEN & RICHARDS
1414 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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